Creating New Pasts: Reality, Facticity and Interpretation in Peirce and Heidegger by Rohr, Susanne
 





Creating New Pasts: Reality, Facticity and







European Association for American Studies
 
Electronic reference
Susanne Rohr, « Creating New Pasts: Reality, Facticity and Interpretation in Peirce and Heidegger », 
European journal of American studies [Online], 15-1 | 2020, Online since 11 May 2020, connection on 10
December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/15604  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.
15604 
This text was automatically generated on 10 December 2020.
Creative Commons License
Creating New Pasts: Reality,
Facticity and Interpretation in
Peirce and Heidegger
Susanne Rohr
1 The relationship between Peirce and Heidegger, or between Peirce’s pragmatism and
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is not a happy one. It is a love story that could
easily have been but never was. And only recently have the striking parallels between
the two philosophies been fully acknowledged and assessed—the profound differences
that,  of  course,  exist  between  them,  notwithstanding.  In  what  follows,  I  will  draw
relationships  between  the  central  assumptions  of  the  two  theories  and  establish
between them what can be called a dialogue. 
2 The  disregard  or  even  rejection  of  pragmatism  in  German  philosophy  is  quite
surprising  given  that  pragmatism  had  a  swift  and  very  hopeful  start  at  the  III.
International Congress for Philosophy held in Heidelberg in 1908, when it dominated
the  conference  as  its  main  topic.  As  a  result  of  this  congress,  pragmatism became
known to Germany’s philosophy scene and the first publications began to appear, such
as  Günther  Jacoby’s  1909  Der  Pragmatismus.  Neue  Bahnen  in  der  Wissenschaftslehre  des
Auslands. Eine Würdigung. In his foreword, Jacoby points out that, not surprisingly, it is
the  unusual  concept  of  truth  that  constitutes  the  core  of  the  most  profound
controversies in both the US and European philosophy. 
3 The outbreak of World War I  abruptly ended the lively debates on pragmatism and
truth, and it is one of the most remarkable, if not lamentable, facts that this debate was
not taken up again for a very long time. If pragmatism was acknowledged at all in that
long period—which arguably ended when Richard Rorty’s Consequences of  Pragmatism
was published in 1982, reigniting the interest in pragmatism in Germany—it was mainly
in  a  vulgarized  version,  devoid  of  sophistication,  featuring  many  anti-American
prejudices and misconceptions. 
4 The Frankfurt School is a case in point. Max Horkheimer, for instance, presumably had
not read any original texts, but even in his American exile still insisted on a policy of
Creating New Pasts: Reality, Facticity and Interpretation in Peirce and Heide...
European journal of American studies, 15-1 | 2020
1
separatism and not taking American philosophy seriously. As Martin Jay points out:
“This allowed it [The Frankfurt School] to make assumptions, such as the equation of
pragmatism with positivism, that lacked complete validity. It also cut the Institut off
from potential  allies  in the American intellectual  tradition,  such as  George Herbert
Mead” (289). A notable exception on the German scene is Arnold Gehlen’s Der Mensch.
Seine  Natur  und  seine  Stellung  in  der  Welt,  published  in  1940.  It  acknowledges
pragmatism’s  potential  in  conceptualizing  the  subject  as  genuinely  interactive  and
directed towards the other. Gehlen points out that pragmatism is “the only philosophy
to date that fundamentally sees man as a being that acts” and, furthermore, “that the
basic structure of all mental phenomena is action directed towards another.”1
5 Tracing the convoluted reception of  pragmatism in the German context,  Heidegger
undoubtedly plays the most unfortunate role. While today, as I have pointed out, many
similarities  between  his  existential  philosophy  and  pragmatism  have  been
acknowledged,  Heidegger  himself  is  an  example  of  the  prejudiced  and  misguided
discussions which monopolized German philosophy since the 1920s.  In an interview
with Rudolf Augstein, editor of the German news magazine Der Spiegel that took place in
1966  but  was  only  published  posthumously  in  1976,  Heidegger  typically  equates
pragmatism with positivism and holds that the Americans “are still  caught up in a
thought (Pragmatism) which favors functions and manipulations” (“Only a God Can
Save Us” 43). 
6 Klaus Oehler recalls a meeting with Heidegger, in which the philosopher stated that
pragmatism “was nothing but a Weltanschauung for engineers and not for human beings
in the full sense of the word” (33). This blatant expression of anti-Americanism is all
the more regrettable as it completely misses out on the many intersections between
Heidegger’s hermeneutics and pragmatism’s main concerns. And it is to these points of
overlap  that  I  will  now  turn  in  order  to  establish  a  dialogue  between  the  two
approaches.  Let  me  begin,  however,  by  pointing  out  that  in  my  discussion  of
pragmatism I will mainly concentrate on the writings of its founder, Charles Sanders
Peirce, and only sporadically consider the pragmatist versions of other thinkers. 
7 Assessing the general profile of both Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology and the
pragmatism of Peirce, a shared core concern becomes apparent: the rejection of the
traditional  dichotomy of  realism and  idealism.2 Both  thinkers  seek  to  situate  their
theories in a place beyond these philosophical traditions, and they each bring man’s
knowing of the world and the being of man in the world together, although imbedded in
their different theoretical layout and argumentative structures. Heidegger takes the
route via his crucial definition of understanding which to him is a fundamental mode of
Being, conceptualized as Being-in-the-world or Dasein. Being is not something stable—
and I will return to this characteristic shortly—but must be understood as a dynamic
process, as the condition for the emergence of entities and world out of concealment
into unconcealment.
8 Discussing  Heidegger’s  “hermeneutics  of  facticity”  in  contrast  to  competing
hermeneutical  perspectives,  eminent  Heidegger  exegete  Hans-Georg  Gadamer
underscores the centrality of Heidegger’s definition of the concept of understanding:
Understanding is not a resigned ideal of human experience adopted in the old age of
the spirit, as with Dilthey; nor is it, as with Husserl, a last methodological ideal of
philosophy in contrast to the naivete of unreflecting life; it is, on the contrary, the
original  form  of  the  realization  of  Dasein,  which  is  being-in-the-world.  Before  any
differentiation  of  understanding  into  the  various  directions  of  pragmatic  or
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theoretical  interest,  understanding  is  Dasein's  mode  of  being,  insofar  as  it  is
potentiality-for-being  and  “possibility”  […].  Understanding  is  the  original
characteristic of the being of human life itself. (Truth and Method 250)
9 To return to  the  realism vs.  idealism tradition,  here  both  Heidegger’s  and Peirce’s
examination of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is, of course, of major importance. In
discussing Kant’s crucial definition of the thing-in-itself, Heidegger presents the view
that  we  encounter  entities  only  in  virtue  of  the  world  within  which  they  can  be
disclosed. Furthermore, the thing is independent of Dasein, but not in such a way as to
be independent of the sense structure for its understanding. In his rainbow metaphor,
Peirce  makes  the  same claim:  “everything which is  present  to  us  is  a  phenomenal
manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something
without us, just as a rainbow is at one a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain”
(5.283).3 In Heidegger’s approach, the experience of a thing reveals its structure,  to
which Dasein has an anticipatory relation. To return to Gadamer again for a moment, he
sees this as a crucial move in the hermeneutics of facticity as for him it was only the
“confrontation with the incomprehensibility of factive Being itself,” a core assumption
of  Heidegger’s  thinking,  that  “constituted  a  break  with  the  idealist  notion  of
hermeneutics.” (Hermeneutik II 323; my translation, S.R.)
10 I argue that the pragmatic maxim, the core of pragmatist philosophy, serves the same
function, as it describes how the direct experience of an object, the examination of its
function, practical consequences, and the use we make of it reveals its meaning. The
pragmatic maxim reads as follows: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical  bearings,  we  conceive  the  object  of  our  conception  to  have.  Then,  our
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (5.402). The
crucial difference is, of course, that, for Peirce, factive Being is not incomprehensible but
endlessly comprehensible, in an unlimited flow of interpretations. Still, the two theories
are  closely  connected  with  regard  to  this  essential  element:  For  both  Peirce  and
Heidegger hold that to understand a thing, to get its meaning,  one has to grasp the
pattern of those activities or possibilities into which the thing is typically involved and
into which one is led when using the thing. 
11 In  Heidegger’s  and  Peirce’s  particular  definitions  of  the  interrelations  between
consciousness and object, of knower and known, the role of pre-scientific experience
comes into play. It seems to me that here, in their corresponding conceptualization of
this  initial  involvement  as  anticipatory  structure  we  find  a  particularly  important
congruence  between  the  two  approaches,  and  I  would  call  them  their  respective
“hermeneutical  core.”  For  in  Peirce’s  approach,  idealist  and  realist  positions  also
converge, and this happens in the dimension of pre-scientific experience. Following
realist positions, Peirce sees reality as genuinely open to knowledge, yet from idealism
he adopts the view that this knowledge can only be in signs. Hence his definition: “what
we think of cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the thought
thinking and the immediate thought-object  are the very same thing regarded from
different points of view” (6.339). This causes him to see reality not as the starting point
of  interpretation  but  as  its  final  result,  a  strictly  semiotic  process  that  relies  on
anticipatory structures akin to Heidegger’s. 
12 For  all  sign  processes  according  to  Peirce  rely  on  an  initial  moment  of  informed
guessing which Peirce calls abductive inference, a procedure that encompasses “all the
operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered” (5.590). In abductive
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inferences, subjective and culturally predetermined elements converge that determine
the result: an assumption about what might be the case, a guess at the riddle. In this
perspective,  reality  in  its  initial  moment  of  constitution  is  the  result  of  informed
guessing.  True  to  pragmatist  philosophy,  this  process  also  encompasses  an
intersubjective dimension, as reality is a decidedly communal product: 
The real,  then,  is  that which,  sooner or later,  information and reasoning would
finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you.
Thus  the  very  origin  of  the  conception  of  reality  shows  that  this  conception
essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY [sic], without definite limits, and
capable of a definite increase of knowledge. (5.311)
13 As these descriptions show, the semiotic dimension is crucial in both approaches, and
its implications are significant. Both Peirce and Heidegger understand the subject as
situated in language, thus Being and Dasein for Heidegger is as fundamentally mediated
as it is for Peirce for whom existence is always already mediated by semiosis. As such,
both Dasein and existence are constituted in and as moments of sign interpretations,
forever evolving as they are situation-bound and thus open to re-interpretation at any
moment. Only temporarily do they congeal into knowledge.
14 Correlating  Heidegger’s  and  Peirce’s  perspectives,  Klaus  Oehler  describes  the
vulnerability of the process as follows: “The future reveals a new reality, and in the
light of a new reality the past also takes on a new appearance. While travelling forward
into a new reality in the future, man is at the same time on his way into a new past. As
existence  is  illuminated in  this  way,  truth comes into  being” (31).  Both Dasein and
existence, that is, present themselves as paradoxical conditions, they are retrospective
and future-oriented at the same time. For it is in continuously creating new pasts that
we  establish  knowledge  and  truth,  which  makes  these  relative  to  a  context  and
therefore genuinely temporal. The two-faced situatedness of human existence as seen
in  its  temporal  dimension  was  also  explored  extensively  by  William  James  in  his
pragmatist analysis of the human perception of time, who found the following powerful
image for capturing it: 
the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-bag, with a certain
breadth  of  its  own  on  which  we  sit  perched,  and  from  which  we  look  in  two
directions  into  time.  The  unit  of  composition  of  our  perception  of  time  is  a
duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking
end. (609)
15 Returning  to  Peirce  and  Heidegger,  I  would  now  like  to  look  more  closely  at  the
theoretical  basis  of  assessing  the  precariousness  of  human  life  and  see  how  both
philosophers develop their respective argument. It all starts with a particular mode of
taking in and interacting with the world. Let me explain.
16 In  1955,  Heidegger  in  his  “Memorial  Address”  for  the  composer  Conradin Kreutzer
made a distinction between “calculative” and “meditative” reasoning, pleading for the
latter modality.4 He laments the dominance of calculative thinking which, he claims,
makes  us  a  “perplexed  victim  at  the  mercy  of  the  irresistible  superior  power  of
technology” (“Memorial Address” 52–53) and furthermore holds it responsible for what
he  sees  as  the  thoughtlessness  of  his  time.  Thereby,  as  I  would  argue,  Heidegger
uncannily comments on our present situation as well: “All of us, including those who
think professionally, as it were, are often enough thought-poor; we all are far too easily
thought-less.… For nowadays we take in everything in the quickest and cheapest way,
only to forget it just as quickly, instantly” (“Memorial Address” 45). The media as one
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of the main facilitators of this kind of being in the world, “give the illusion of a world
that is no world” (“Memorial Address” 48).
17 What, then, is gained by comparison in practicing meditative thinking? To Heidegger,
but also to Peirce, it is of utmost importance, as this mode is the basis and starting
point  for  all  systematic,  controlled  thinking.  As  such,  it  is  the  condition  for  new
developments, including scientific discovery. For discovery relies on creativity, on a
certain openness towards the phenomena that is characteristic of meditative thinking.
To quote Heidegger: “Meditative thinking demands of us not to cling one-sidedly to a
single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas” (“Memorial Address” 55).
Developments and discoveries thus demand of us “that we engage ourselves with what
at first sight does not go together at all” (“Memorial Address” 55). What is more, a
certain aesthetic dimension will then open up in the process as well, for it is only in
meditative thinking,  Heidegger claims,  that we then “notice that a work of  art  has
flowered in the ground of our homeland” (“Memorial Address” 47). As an intermediate
result we might say at this point that facticity in this perspective both presents itself to
us and is created by us as a work of art.
18 Peirce  describes  the  same  process—the  process  of  abductive  inference  already
mentioned above—along similar lines. For him, it is the “idea of putting together what
we had never before dreamed of putting together” (5.181),  he calls it  “reverie with
some  qualification”  and  “Pure  Play”  (6.458)  in  which  the  mind  searches  for
connections: 
It begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one of
the  three  Universes  [of  experience:  mere  Ideas,  Brute  Actuality,  Signs].  But
impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing
into a lively give and take of communion between self and self. If one’s observations
and reflections  are  allowed to  specialize  themselves  too much,  the  Play  will  be
converted into scientific study. (6.459) 
19 For  both  Heidegger  and  Peirce,  this  passive-active  interplay  of  impression  and
reflection  constitutes  an  anticipatory  structure,  a  fore-understanding  and  an
orientation of the mind to receive.
20 Having  a  closer  look  at  Peirce’s  theory  now,  we  first  need  to  recognize  that  it  is
persistently  ordered  by  dependency,  so  that  his  entire  theoretical  architecture  is
structured by a strict  hierarchy in which the highest elements incorporate and are
genuinely shaped by those elements on which they rest.  In his  classification of  the
sciences, for instance, Metaphysics depends on and is influenced by Phenomenology,
and  Logic  rests  on  Aesthetics.  Phenomenology  again  provides  the  three  universal
categories, and the order of dependency determines that Thirdness as the category of
sign  relations,  of  mediation  and  language,  is  dependent  on  and  encompasses  both
Secondness—or  mere  being  and  experience—and  Firstness—or  pure  quality  and
impression.  In  terms  of  their  modality,  that  of  Thirdness  is  necessity,  that  of
Secondness reality, and Firstness’s modality is possibility. As the order of dependency
implies,  reality,  for  instance,  as  a  product  of  sign  processes  and thus  representing
Thirdness by necessity incorporates elements of pure quality and reveals an aesthetic
dimension. Translated into the categories of consciousness, the implication would be in
the Peircean system that every thought has an affective quality.5 As Heidegger would
have it, calculative reasoning is dependent on feeling or meditative reasoning. 
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21 How,  then,  do  we  describe  the  infrastructure  of  the  transition  from  meditative  to
calculative reasoning and back again? The issue here seems to be a phenomenological
one, as it consists of coming to terms with the various forms of experience, particularly
in their first and pre-scientific form. Phenomenology’s function, Peirce stresses, is to 
make out what […] the elements of appearance that present themselves to us every
hour and every minute [are], whether we are pursuing earnest investigations or are
undergoing the strangest vicissitudes of experience, or are dreamily listening to the
tales of Scheherezade. (Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking 152)
22 However, as both Peirce and Heidegger maintain, this task of identifying and classifying
the elements of experience that continuously flood our perceptions is not an easy one,
for the intimate nearness and familiarity of the initial encounter makes them hard to
grasp.  Thus,  when  we  ask  about  the  precise  nature  of  the  present  instance,  the
question, for Peirce, “always comes too late” (1.310). Similarly, Heidegger argues that it
is not distance but rather proximity that conceals: “the way to what is near is always
the longest and thus the hardest for us humans” (“Memorial Address” 53).
23 But  how do we get  there,  how do we distance ourselves  from the elements  of  our
perception and at the same time stay close to them? How do we let the world go at the
same time that we firmly embrace it in acts of re-creation? Peirce’s answer is precise:
the  “artist’s  observational  power  is  what  is  most  wanted  in  the  study  of
phenomenology”  (5.42).  And  this  power  is  the  capacity  of  creativity,  of  abductive
inference, it  is  the “idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of
putting  together”  (5.181),  as  I  have  already  quoted.  Very  much  in  the  same  vein,
Heidegger demands “that we engage ourselves with what at  first  sight does not go
together at all” (“Memorial Address” 53). In this way contemplative thinking is set into
motion and the phenomena of the world appear to us as a work of art.  As already
indicated, for both Peirce and Heidegger, this is a paradoxical process that requires to
be passive and active at the same time: “we let ourselves into releasement to that-
which-regions, we will non-willing” (“Conversation on a Country Path” 79). That the
phenomena appear in the aesthetic  dimension finds a  correlative dimension in our
response as the qualitative feel of the object.6 
24 But  to  return  to  Heidegger  and  Peirce  and  to  the  next  step  in  the  process  from
meditative  to  calculative  thinking—the  following  step  is  the  need  to  identify  the
percepts. I am quoting Peirce again: What is now needed is “the resolute discrimination
which fastens itself like a bulldog upon the particular feature that we are studying,
follow[ing] it wherever it may lurk, and detect[ing] it beneath all its guises” (5.42). This
requires yet again a paradoxical mindset or mode, as it depends on the coexistence of
both patience and persistence, or the artist’s sensitivity and the bulldog’s resoluteness.
Heidegger makes quite a similar claim when in “Conversation on a Country Path About
Thinking” he suggests passivity as tenor––he instructs us to wait and act at the same
time  and  proposes  the  concept  of  “non-willing,”  meaning  “willingly  to  renounce
willing”  (“Conversation  on  a  Country  Path”  59)  to  reach  a  “thinking  that  is  not  a
willing”  (“Conversation  on a  Country  Path”  60).  Then “out  of  the  view which  [the
horizon] encircles, the appearance of objects comes to meet us” (“Conversation on a
Country Path” 65).
25 This,  however,  is  not  yet  the  end  of  the  transition  from  meditative  to  calculative
thinking, as generating categories is now necessary. Peirce describes the final step as
follows: “the third faculty we shall need is the generalizing power of the mathematician
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who produces the abstract formula that comprehends the very essence of the feature
under  examination”  (5.42).  There  is  one  quality  that  facilitates  the  transition from
complete openness to controlled thinking and accompanies it along the way: It is, as
Peirce calls it,  the attitude of agape,  or love for truth. “It is not by dealing out cold
justice to the circle of my ideas that I  can make them grow, but by cherishing and
tending  them  as  I  would  the  flowers  in  my  garden”  (6.289),  Peirce  writes.  For
Heidegger,  it  is  the  attitude  of  “concernedness”  (Sorge)  that  plays  the  same  role.
Phenomenology, that is, needs the willed-unwilled disposition of an open mind, and
this in turn needs the agape of the thinker.
26 If  we  return  to  the  question  of  object  formation  for  a  moment,  another  point  of
intersection between the two theories becomes apparent. As I have already indicated
above when I presented Peirce’s conceptualization of the real as the product of semiotic
processes,  the  dimension  of  intersubjectivity  as  well  as  the  communal  aspect  are
inevitably inherent there. For the real, let me repeat, is not the starting point, but the
product of  processes  of  sign  interpretations.  Every  sign,  due  to  the  hierarchical
structure of Peirce’s philosophy, by necessity entails subjective as well  as culturally
predetermined patterns of interpretation that are shared by a particular culture at a
particular time. By introducing the concept of “references” (Verweisungen), Heidegger,
for his part, establishes the communal and intersubjective connection. References can
be understood as the relation things have to each other and to the human mind by
being  connected  in  practical  concerns.  For  example,  a  nail  only  makes  sense  “in
reference to” a hammer.7 According to Heidegger, caring for these everyday things is
crucial  because  this  discloses  the  Being of  the  being,  discloses  Dasein.  What  is  also
important here is the connective power inherent in references. For the individual is
limitless  in  terms  of  the  references  he  or  she  might  be  affected  by,  and  this
limitlessness  connects  individuals  into  communities.  The  individual  is  not  seen  as
independent  self,  but  as  someone  who,  in  incorporating  Dasein,  is  always  already
connected with others by way of the many references that implicate the individual. 8So,
while, as Heidegger holds, being is prior to beings, tending to or caring for the many
references that connect objects and persons constitutes Dasein in all of its dimensions
and facets.  For  worldliness  is  embeddedness,  and  something  gets  meaning  only  by
virtue of being caught up in an ensemble of relations.
27 I would now like to turn to the final concept of this essay that I have, until now, only
considered in passing: the question of truth. For Peirce, processes of sign interpretation
tend to evolve towards truthful interpretations that are socially shared. Thus, reality—
and truth—are consensual products. “Final opinions,” Peirce calls them, “that which,
sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in” (5.311). However,
although these opinions are consensual and by definitionem fallible, they are not relative
or formed as  needed,  as  typical  accusations of  pragmatism would have it,  but  self-
correcting and guided by common sense. Truth, in Peirce’s perspective, functions as a
regulatory element in public discourse and is a product of the universal method that
inevitably underlies all processes of thinking and interpretation, be those individual or
communal, private or scientifically controlled, evolving unconsciously or as a conscious
procedure.  While  this  method  rests  on  creative  guessing,  a particularly  uncertain
ground,  it  nonetheless  secures  the  self-correcting  quality  of  the  result  as  well.
According to Peirce, the universal method consists of the process of first abductively
generating explanatory hypotheses about what might be the case, that are then revised
in inductive and deductive examination, only to start anew, endlessly. The potentially
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endless progression of this sequence generates interpretations that approximate truth
as  faulty  or  questionable  elements  are  continuously  combed  out  inductively  and
deductively.
28 The discussion of the nature of truth plays a large part in Heidegger’s philosophical
oeuvre  as  well.  As  with  most  of  his  essential  concepts,  he  develops  a  specific
terminology in the discussion, in this case he refers back to the ancient concept of alē
theia, meaning  “unconcealment”  or  Unverborgenheit in  German.  Unconconcealment
belongs primordially to Dasein,  as Dasein unfolds in events of uncovering, that is,  in
moments where the meaning of a phenomenon is uncovered for the individual and by
the  individual.9 Akin  to  Peirce’s  pragmatist  view which I  have  just  sketched,  these
moments  are  carried  out  by  interpretation  and  thus  require  creativity,  as
unconcealment is about creating a context within which things can be what they are.
This constitutes the first and crucial step towards truth, or change from concealment
to unconcealment, and facilitates the transition from the pre-predicative experience of
things  into  the  possibility  of  articulating  experience  in  propositions.10 For  Peirce,
abductive inference serves the very same function as it transfers percepts, or sense
impressions,  into  perceptual  judgments,  or  hypotheses,  that  can then be  examined
inductively and deductively, as explained above. Finally, for both Peirce and Heidegger,
these moments of transition involve a subjective as well as an intersubjective, social
dimension,  for  tradition  and  history  influence  the  constitution  of  propositions  as
individuals share the public knowledge of their age, or, as Heidegger calls it, are part of
“publicity” (Öffentlichkeit).
29 As such, depending on the realms of discourse individuals share, they can certainly go
wrong in their acts of unconcealment—particularly when presented “alternative facts”
from sources they trust.
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NOTES
1. Quoted in Oehler 29. Translated by Oehler.
2. Cf. also Bourgeois, and Rosenthal. 
3. Peirce, Charles Sanders.  Collected Papers  of  Charles  Sanders  Peirce.  References to the Collected
Papers are generally made in the form of decimal quotation, i.e. indicating volume and paragraph.
Thus, a number like the above '5.283' points to volume V, § 283. Hereafter, I will only give the
decimal quotation when referring to the Collected Papers. 
4. For a more detailed discussion of this distinction cf. Anderson. The concept of “calculative
thinking”  can  be  traced  in  Heidegger’s  anti-Semitic  remarks  on  “World  Jewry”  in  his  Black
Notebooks. These private musings, which Heidegger kept for more than forty years, constitute a
very  difficult  context.  When the  notebooks  from 1931  to  1941  were  published in  2014,  they
immediately  sparked  international  controversy  for  they  showed  for  the  first  time  how
profoundly Heidegger’s anti-Semitism shaped his philosophical thinking. This poses the question
of how, then, we are to engage with an important philosophy that seems contaminated by anti-
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Semitism? While I do not wish to enter this debate here, I want to acknowledge its urgency. Cf.
Farin, and Malpas.
5. Robert E. Innis discusses Peirce’s concept of the aesthetic dimension as follows: “Indeed, for
Peirce  the  mind  of  the  interpreter  is  a  ‘topos’  or  ‘place’  or  ‘space’  where  the  ‘play’  of
interpretants  takes  place. We  are  ‘in’  the  play  rather  than  the  play  being  in  us—Gadamer’s
position exactly” (26).
6. Dewey again saw this and made this qualitative affinity between a feeling and a form the
cornerstone of his pragmatist aesthetics, where it constitutes the preanalytic apprehension of
significance that then goes over into the analytic or hermeneutic phase.
7. On Heidegger’s account of references cf. Kockelmann 166–167.
8. Heidegger’s term for the intersubjective condition is „Mitsein.“ In Sein und Zeit he writes: „Die
Welt des Daseins ist Mitwelt. Das In-Sein ist Mitsein mit Anderen. Das innerweltliche Ansichsein
dieser ist Mitdasein“ (118). 
9. My account of alētheia and truth refers to the way Heidegger develops this connection in Being
and Time, in other words, before the turn. Cf. also Koskela.
10. Wrathall describes concealment as “a nonassertoric dealing with the world in the sense that,
in such pre-predicative comportments, the world is experienced in a way that lacks determinacy,
that is, propositional articulation” (19).
ABSTRACTS
Only recently have the striking parallels  between Charles S.  Peirce’s  pragmatism and Martin
Heidegger’s  hermeneutics  of  facticity  been  fully  acknowledged  and  assessed–the  profound
differences that, of course, exist between them, notwithstanding. This essay draws relationships
between the central assumptions of the two theories and establishes between them what can be
called a dialogue.
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